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cargo clause,3 4 another ICC examiner has recommended that that agency lacks
the power to outlaw hot cargo clauses in labor contracts and that this controversy should be handled by the National Labor Relations Board or Congress.3 5 But, while the majority of hot cargo clause cases have involved common carriers, the Board has never discussed the existence of this duty in upholding the validity of these clauses. It may well feel that this problem, involving a carrier's duty, is beyond its limited powers. Yet, hot cargo clauses involving common carriers are directly contrary to what legislatures and the common
law have conceived to be the public good. Unless the Commission or the Board
assume jurisdiction, it remains for Congress or the courts to see that this problem is resolved."
34 ICC Rule Bars Teamster Boycott of Hot Cargoes, N.Y. Times, p. 1, col. 6, p. 20, col. 8
(April 10, 1957).
15Examiner Rules ICC Lacks Power to Ban "Hot Cargo" Clauses, The Vall Street Journal, p. 5, col. 3 (Aug. 12, 1957).
- As this comment went to press, the Board, in a proceeding charging an 8(b) (4) (A) violation, held invalid a hot cargo clause contained in the union contract of a common carrier.
Genuine Parts Co., 119 N.L.R.B. No. 53 (1957). Chairman Leedom and Member Jenkins
felt that the Board's prior rationale upholding such clauses-i.e., that since a boycott established by a secondary employer at the union's request is concededly valid, an agreement to
establish a boycott should also be valid-did not apply to cases involving common carriers,
since "under the express provisions of the [Interstate Commerce Act], common carriers...
are not free to decide, at will, to withhold the services they hold themselves out as able to
perform, from any customer or class of customers." Ibid. Iember Rodgers felt that hot cargo
clauses are always invalid, since they contravene a section of the Taft-Hartley Act designed
to protect the public. Mfember Bean concurred solely on the ground that the facts brought the
case within the doctrine of Sand Door and Plywood Co. Member Murdock dissented, arguing
that questions involving a duty under the Interstate Commerce Act should be decided by
the ICC.
In terms of the results of cases before the Board, this new decision marks no change; even
under the Sand Door and Plywood Co., and American Iron, cases, the existence of a hot cargo
clause was irrelevant to the question of whether an 8(b)(4)(A) violation occurred. And there
has been no change in the requirement of inducement, unless the dictum of Leedom and Jenkins, to the effect that the existence of a hot cargo clause is of itself prima facie evidence of
inducement, is accepted. Id., at n. 30. However, by placing its decision on a ground that
eliminates, at least for common carriers, the indefensible "valid but unenforceable" rubric,
the Board may have increased chances for ultimate court acceptance of its position.

EXTRASTATE ENFORCEMENT OF PENAL LAWS
Since Chief Justice Marshall's statement that "courts of no country execute
the penal laws of another,"' many American courts considered the characterization of a law of another jurisdiction as "penal" to be sufficient grounds
for refusing to enforce a judgment or cause of action based upon that law.' In
' The Antelope, 10 Wheat. (U.S.) 66, 123 (1825). In this case the Court held that a Spanish
statute decreeing forfeiture of slaving vessels would not be enforced with respect to a Spanish
craft captured off the American coast by a United States revenue-cutter.
'E.g., Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) (denying enforcement to judgment
based on statute imposing fine for failure to file statement about the business of a fire insurance
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general, laws have been considered penal when the recovery provided for is not
restricted to compensation for the injury suffered, or when liability is imposed
without regard to whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by the defendant's noncompliance.
Marshall's statement first received serious critical examination in 1932, when
Professor Robert Leflar in a persuasive article suggested that neither judgments
nor causes of action should be denied enforcement because the statute upon
which they are based is penal.' Since publication of that article, full faith and
credit principles, which seem contrary to the idea that a foreign penal law need
not be enforced, have been fortified by Supreme Court decisions.4 To determine whether Leflar's suggestion has been followed by the courts, it is necessary to consider the present status of the penal concept in its role as an exception to full faith and credit principles.5
The United States Supreme Court is strict in requiring that full faith and
credit be given to judgments, even though they may be based on so-called
penal causes of action. In Huntington v. Attrill,6 the Court held that a state

was required to give full faith and credit to a judgment based on a statute of a
sister state making directors who signed false public certificates liable for corporate debts regardless of whether the plaintiffs had relied on such certificates.
This case is generally taken to stand for the proposition that no judgments can
properly be denied full faith and credit on the penal theory save those based
upon criminal statutes.' In 1935 this proposition was applied in Milwaukee
County v. M. E. White Co.' to a statute providing for a non-compensatory penalty. In that case the Court held full faith and credit due a foreign judgment for
state income taxes, although it included a "penalty" 9 for delinquent payment.
corporation); Attrill v. Huntington, 70 Md. 191, 16 Atl. 651 (1889) (denying enforcement to
judgment based on statute imposing personal liability for corporate debts for making false
representations in public reports). Cases denying enforcement to "penal" causes of action are
cited in notes 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, infra.
3Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1932).
4
See Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 Col. L. Rev.
153 (1949).
5U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 1. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution is implemented by statute, 1 Stat. 122 (1790), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 (1948). For a discussion
of the nature and effect of the 1948 amendment to this statute, see note 12 infra.
The term penal is used in other connections also, and this has contributed to difficulties
which exist with respect to its use in the conflict of laws area. For instance, the type of statute
which receives a short period of limitations is called penal.
6146-U.S. 657 (1892).
7E.g., Full Faith and Credit to Statutes, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 536, 538 (1954). Criminal
statutes are discussed at note 26 infra.
8296 U.S. 268 (1935).
1Id., at 279 (quotation marks are the Court's).
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The Court remarked:
In a suit upon a money judgment for a civil cause of action the validity of the claim
upon which it was founded is not open to inquiry, whatever its genesis.... Recovery
upon it can be resisted only on the grounds that the court which rendered it was without jurisdiction [citing cases]; or that it has ceased to be obligatory because of payment
or other discharge [citing cases]; or that it is a cause of action for which the state of the
forum has not provided a court [citing cases]; or possibly because procured by fraud. 10
The omission from this statement of the familiar defense that it was a penal
statute which gave rise to the judgment is significant. It is improbable that the
so-called penal exception has any further vitality as regards full faith and credit
to foreign civil judgments."
Full faith and credit to foreign penal causes of action does not seem to be as
firmly established as for judgments. Since 1932, when the Leflar article appeared, causes of action created by statutes of sister states have sometimes
been denied enforcement for the reason that they are penal in nature. However, the 1948 revision of the statute which implements the full faith and credit
clause may have some significance in compelling greater full faith and credit to
causes of actions. 12
Causes of action based upon foreign statutes imposing personal liability on
corporate officials or shareholders for corporate debts seem to be refused enforcement as many times as they are enforced. 3 The notion that these causes
of action are penal is still regarded by some courts as a proper ground for deny14
ing full faith and credit.
10Id., at 275-76.
"This position is supported by Connolly v. Bell, 141 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1955) (enforcing
judgment rendered in civil action even though original claim was brought by state officials in
state's behalf and damages awarded were in excess of complainant's financial loss); Jos. Riedel
Glass Works, Inc. v. Keegan, 43 F.Supp. 153 (S.D. Me., 1942) (holding that penal laws
are only those imposing punishment for offenses against the state which the Executive has
power to pardon); New York v. Coe -Mfg. Co., 112 N.J.L. 536, 172 Atl. 198 (S.Ct., 1934) (enforcing foreign judgment for franchise tax imposed on foreign corporations doing business in
state and for statutory penalties imposed for failure to comply). See also Paulsen, Enforcing the Mfoney judgment of a Sister State, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 202, 207-8 (1957).
12In 1948, 1 Stat. 122 (1790) was amended by 62 Stat. 947, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738 to specify
that the public acts of sister states must be given the same faith and credit in every state as
is accorded to judgments of sister states.
1"Enforcement denied: Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 208 F.2d 310 (C.A. 6th, 1953),
rev'g 206 F.2d 671 (C.A. 6th, 1953); Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 261
S.W. 2d 127 (1953); Nesbitt v. Clark, 272 Pa. 161, 116 Atl. 404 (1922), cert. denied 258 U.S.
621 (1922); cf. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, 314 U.S. 201 (1941); see Schaefer v. H. B.
Green Transportation Line, 232 F.2d 415 (C.A. 7th, 1956). Contra:Broderick v. Rosner, 294
U.S. 629 (1935); Abercrombie v. United Light & Power Co., 7 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md., 1934);
Doggrell v. Great Southern Box Co., 206 F.2d 671 (C.A. 6th, 1953) rev'd on rehearing, 208
F.2d 310 (C.A. 6th, 1953); Karvalsky v. Becker, 217 Ind. 524, 29 N.E.2d 560 (1940).
11E.g.: "[T]he penal nature of the Arkansas law in question is such that the Tennessee
Court is not required by the full faith and credit clause of our Federal Constitution to give it
effect." Paper Products Co. v. Doggrell, 195 Tenn. 581, 592, 261 S.W.2d 127, 131-32 (1953),
noted in 38 Minn. L. Rev. 536 (1954).
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Another type of action which has been labelled penal and not enforced is
that originating from foreign usury statutes which provide for forfeiture of all
interest or two or three times the interest, 15 or for the borrower's payment of interest at the legal rate to a common school fund of the county where the action
was brought. 6 The only post-1932 case of this nature that was found branded
such a usury statute penal and denied it enforcement."
Actions to recover exemplary damages have been denied extraterritorial enforcement on penal grounds. 8 Here again authority is sparse, but at least one
case decided after the Leflar article held that a foreign statute permitting recovery of exemplary damages was enforceable. 9 The most recent case holding
such a statute unenforceable on the theory that it is penal was decided in
1929.20

Causes of action founded on foreign wrongful death statutes imposing minimum recoveries or awarding damages according to the defendant's culpability
2
have also been denied enforcement because courts considered them penal. '
In the recent cases of Hughes v. Fetter22 and First NationalBank v. United Air
Lines,"5 however, the Supreme Court prohibited states from denying full faith
and credit to a wrongful death action based upon a statute of another state. In
those cases the Court held that a state's policy against entertaining such causes
of action must give way to "the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full
Faith and Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each state
of the obligations or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states.
.".,24But it does not seem entirely safe to conclude that Hughes and United

require full faith and credit to wrongful death statutes which provide for mini15Willis v. Cameron, 12 Abb. Pr. 245 (N.Y. C.P., 1861).
6E.g., Crebbin v. Deloney, 70 Ark. 493, 69 S.W. 312 (1902).
17 McCans v. Brandtlen & Kluge, Inc., 179 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. Civ. App., 1944).
18Taylor v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95 Iowa 740, 64 N.W. 660 (1895) (claim for exemplary damages based on statute of another state), and see other cases collected in Leflar, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 210.
Claims for exemplary damages given by a federal statute have even been denied enforcement on penal grounds. Robinson v. Norato, 71 R.I. 256, 43 A.2d 467 (1945) (in suit by
tenant against landlord for overcharges of rent, Federal Emergency Price Control Act held
penal and unenforceable). But in Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), which was a suit by an
automobile purchaser against a seller to enforce the statutory liability of triple the amount of

the overceiling price, the Court assumed that the statute was penal and held that the Supremacy Clause of the federal Constitution required its enforcement by a state.
19Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Co., 205 N.C. 292, 171 S.E. 100 (1933).
2" Grinestaff v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 253 Ill.App. 589 (1929) (claim for exemplary damages
based on common law of another state).
"1E.g., McLay v. Slade, 48 R.I. 357, 138 Atl. 212 (1927), and see cases collected in Leflar,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 206-7.
22341

U.S. 609 (1951).

2"342 U.S. 396 (1952), rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 921 (1952).
2 Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951).
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mum recoveries or measure damages by the defendant's culpability, because
that type of statute was not involved in those cases.
Finally, courts split on whether extraterritorial enforcement should be
denied actions for taxes in which statutory penalties in the form of interest are
sought. "5 Since no court has allowed recovery of the penalty without allowing
recovery of the tax claim, those cases which deny enforcement of the action
may be explained on the basis of the maxim that foreign tax claims will not be
enforced.
The foregoing indicates that the penal exception to full faith and credit requirements is on the decline, but that it is still very much alive. It seems advisable to consider reasons which might justify this kind of exception to full
faith and credit principles. From such an examination it would seem that
full faith and credit should not be refused judgments or actions on penal grounds
unless they are based upon laws for the violation of which satisfaction may be
2
had on the body of the defendant, that is, criminal laws.. 1
The problem of enforcing a foreign criminal judgment is not likely to arise.
Since a defendant cannot be tried criminally in his absence 27 the state rendering
judgment must have had him in custody and normally would deal with him
then. Moreover, if a state were required to enforce foreign criminal judgments
or actions, it would be in the position of bearing the expense of prison facilities
for violators of another state's laws. In addition, for foreign criminal actions
there would be the necessity of criminal trials, often more expensive than civil
proceedings because of the greater procedural protection afforded the criminal
25

Eirforcement denied: Wayne County v. Foster & Reynolds Co., 277 App. Div. 1105, 101
N.Y.S. 2d 526 (1st Dep't, 1950); Wayne County v. American Steel Export Co., 277 App. Div.
585, 101 N.Y.S. 2d 522 (1st Dep't, 1950); Minnesota v. Karp, 84 Ohio App. 51, 84 N.E. 2d 76
(1948); City of Detroit v. Proctor, 5 Terry (Del.) 193, 61 A. 2d 412 (1948); Ohio v. Flower, 59
D. & C. 14 (Pa. C.P., 1947); Hamilton County Treasurer v. Hartzell, 55 D. & C. 100 (Pa.
C.P., 1945). Enforcement allowed: City of New York v. Shapiro, 129 F. Supp. 149 (D. Mass.,
1954); Oklahoma v. H. D. Lee Co., 174 Kan. 114, 254 P. 2d 291 (1953); State of Oklahoma v.
Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W. 2d 919 (1946); Worner's Deed of Trust, 50 Lanc. Rev.
107 (Pa. Orphans Ct., 1946); Standard Embossing Plate Mfg. Co. v. American Salpa Corp.,
113 N.J. Eq. 468, 167 At. 755 (1933); see also Ohio v. Arnett, 314 Ky. 403, 234 S.W. 2d 722
(1950). Cf. cases involving actions on bonds filed by public officers, in which statutory penalties over and above compensation for the loss suffered were sought, such as Arkansas v.
Bowen, 3 App. D.C. 537 (1894) (recovery denied both on bond and for penalty).
2 Under the criminal laws a wrongdoer may be sentenced to death, confined to prison, or
required to pay a fine. If a fine is imposed but not paid, the defendant may be imprisoned so
that he may "work it off." If the defendant is a corporation, failure to pay a fine could result
in an execution upon its property (see, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, § 668), forfeiture of its
charter if it is domiciled in the forum state, or loss of the privilege of transacting business in
the state. 17 Fletcher, Corporations § 8594, at 806 (1933).
27See Ohio Crim. Practice Manual § 2945.12 (Baldwin, 1954), for an example of a state
provision requiring a criminal defendant to be personally present for trial. There is no requirement that a defendant in a civil case be personally present for trial. Service for an in personam
action can be obtained on a party not present in the state under some circumstances, such as
under non-resident motorist statutes. See, e.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 95.2, § 23. See also
Rest., Judgments §§ 22, 30, 33 (1942).
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defendant. " In the face of these inconveniences, there is no strong reason for
allowing extrastate enforcement of criminal judgments or causes of action; extradition procedures usually make it possible for persons accused or convicted
9
of crimes to be brought back to the prosecuting state for trial or punishment.
There is no reason, however, to deny full faith and credit to any civil judgment or cause of action based upon a foreign "penal" law. The expense to the
forum state of the necessary judicial proceedings is no greater than the expense
in cases involving non-penal laws. Moreover, extradition is unavailable in
civil cases; if the defendant has no property in the state where the action originated or the judgment sued on was rendered, denial of extrastate enforcement
may leave the civil plaintiff without remedy.3° The necessities of enforcement
and the absence of objection on grounds of convenience combine to indicate
that the penal exception to full faith and credit should be discarded in all
civil cases.
2

8A criminal defendant must under certain circumstances be provided with counsel, a
jury, a copy of the trial transcript, and so on.
29 U.S. Const. Art. 4, § 2, provides: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony,
or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on demand
of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to
the state having jurisdiction of the crime." In addition thirty-five states have adopted the
Uniform Extradition Act, § 2 of which provides: "[I]t is the duty of the governor of this state
to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United
States any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other crime, who has fled from
justice and is found in this state." Handbook on Interstate Crime Control 10 (Rev. ed., 1949).
For a comprehensive treatment of the interstate criminal problem and of legislation dealing
with it, see the note in 31 Minn. L. Rev. 699 (1947).
20 A defendant against whom a civil judgment has been rendered cannot be held until he
satisfies it, since the practice of imprisonment for debt has been abolished in most states. See
Limitations on State Legislation Imposed by Constitutional Guaranties against Imprisonment for Debt, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 786 (1928); Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 Mich. L. Rev.
24 (1926). Even if a defendant were imprisoned for not satisfying a non-criminal judgment,
it would only be for the purpose of coercing payment and would not constitute a means of
working off the obligation.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION: A REAPPRAISAL
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction in administrative law was conceived as
a maxim to determine whether an issue should be submitted initially to the
agency or to the courts when concurrent jurisdiction existed in both. Fifty years
of constant litigation have failed to formulate the doctrine in a manner which
enables litigants to choose the proper forum with a reasonable degree of certainty. In practice this uncertainty has subjected litigants to the delay and
expense of double proceedings; it may well be asked whether this is too heavy
a price to pay for any advantages the doctrine may have.
The doctrine has been most frequently applied in disputes over railroad
tariffs. The Interstate Commerce Act specifically provides that "any person...
claiming to be damaged by any common carrier... may either make complaint

